Procedural Due Process in the Discipline of Incarcerated Juveniles by Breed, Allen F. & Voss, Paul H.
Pepperdine Law Review
Volume 5
Issue 3 Second Annual Juvenile Law Thematic Journal Article 2
5-15-1978
Procedural Due Process in the Discipline of
Incarcerated Juveniles
Allen F. Breed
Paul H. Voss
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/plr
Part of the Courts Commons, Fourteenth Amendment Commons, and the Juveniles Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at Pepperdine Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Pepperdine Law Review by an authorized administrator of Pepperdine Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
Kevin.Miller3@pepperdine.edu.
Recommended Citation
Allen F. Breed and Paul H. Voss Procedural Due Process in the Discipline of Incarcerated Juveniles, 5 Pepp. L. Rev. 3 (1978)
Available at: http://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/plr/vol5/iss3/2
Procedural Due Process in the Discipline
of Incarcerated Juveniles
ALLEN F. BREED*
PAUL H. VOSS**
INTRODUCTION
Due process1 rights of the imprisoned have been the subject of
several restrictive Supreme Court rulings.2 When these cases
are viewed against the background of already limited juvenile
due process rights3 and the atrocities revealed in numerous
juvenile decisions,4 images of the paintings of Goya are recalled.
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1. The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, Section
One provides in part, "nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law."
2. See part I et seq., infra.
3. See part II et seq., infra.
4. See, e.g., Morales v. Turman, 383 F. Supp. 53 (E.D. Tex. 1974), rev'd. 535
The disciplining of confined juveniles is an area where the need
for effective control is great, and sadly, correctional adminis-
trators have provided little leadership in developing constitu-
tionally sound disciplinary decision-making systems. It is
opined that juveniles are citizens who have all rights commen-
surate with that status, and when a state finds it necessary to
subject a juvenile to "treatment," even greater protection
should be afforded. There is a distressing need for states, legis-
latively and through correctional administrators, to initiate re-
quired procedures, rather than wait for the courts to foist their
less informed judgments upon, them.
The object of this article is to analyze the impact of the Su-
preme Court's position on due process with reference to the
administration of discipline in state juvenile corrections institu-
tions, and to develop a model for disciplinary decision making.
Part I of the article will present recent Supreme Court treat-
ment of procedural due process in the area of prison discipline
in general. Part II will analyze the due process treatment of
juvenile proceedings by the Court. Part III will deal with the
scope of due process in juvenile corrections discipline as ex-
trapolated from parts I and II. Part IV will provide a decision-
making model for the administration of discipline in juvenile
correctional institutions. The article will not treat the due proc-
ess right to treatment in correctional institutions 5 or the rights
of juveniles prior to transfer from the juvenile justice system,6
except as they imply rights in the disciplinary setting. The
eighth amendment prohibition of cruel and unusual punish-
ment is also beyond the scope of this article; however, all disci-
pline must withstand the scrutiny of this dynamic and ethereal
limitation.7
F. 2d 864 (5th Cir. 1976), rev'd, 430 U.S. 322 (1977); Inmates of Boys' Training
School v. Affleck, 346 F. Supp. 1354, 1367 (D.R.I. 1972), where Chief Judge
Pettine ruled:
If a boy were confined indoors by his parents, given no education or
exercise and allowed no visitors and his medical needs were ignored, it
is likely that the state would intervene and remove the child for his own
protection. See R.I.G.L. § 14-1-34. Certainly, then the state acting in its
parens patriae capacity cannot treat the boy in the same manner andjustify having deprived him of his liberty.
5. See generally McNulty and White, The Juvenile's Right to Treatment:
Panacea or Pandora's Box?, 16 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 745 (1976).
6. See generally Vitiello, Constitutional Safeguards for Juvenile Trans-
fer Procedure: The Ten Years Since Kent v. United States, 26 DEPAUL L. REV.
23 (1976).
7. The following general principles or lines of inquiry have emerged in the
application of the cruel and unusual punishment standard to prohibit penal
measures:
(1) Conditions may be so bad they are cruel and unusual themselves.
The federal courts have held punishments to be cruel and unusual
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I. PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS IN ADULT
CORRECTIONAL DISCIPLINE
The seminal case of Goldberg v. Kelly,' while ruling on the
reach of procedural due process, used language which ap-
peared to provide a sound base from which to require due
process in the administration of discipline in correctional in-
stitutions.9 The decision concerned the adequacy of procedures
for termination of financial assistance received pursuant to the
Aid to Families with Dependent Children Program. In finding
summary termination of assistance a violation of the due proc-
ess clause, the Court stated:
The extent to which procedural due process must be afforded the
recipient is influenced by the extent to which he may be "condemned
to suffer grevious loss," (footnote omitted) and depends upon whether
the recipients interest in avoiding that loss outweighs the governmen-
tal interest in summary adjudication.10
The Court mandated the following minimum requirements:
when they are "barbarous" or "shocking to the conscience," Sostre
v. McGinnis, 442 F.2d 178, 191 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S.
978 (1972); "foul,. . . inhuman, and ... violative of basic concepts
of decency," Wright v. McMann, 387 F. 2d 519, 526 (2d Cir. 1967); or
of a "debased" nature, Jordan v. Fitzharris, 257 F. Supp. 674, 680
(N.D. Cal. 1966). Conditions may meet these criteria, in and of them-
selves. These standards are also relative depending on the individu-
al subjected to punishment. For example, institution segregation in
itself is not unconstitutional. See, e.g., Sostre v. McGinnis, 442 F. 2d
178, 192 (2d Cir. 1971). But it may be cruel and unusual for certain
individuals based on mental and physical health, or age, LoUis v.
New York Department of Social Services., 322 F. Supp. 473
(S.D.N.Y. 1970).
(2) Punishments may be cruel and unusual if greater than necessary to
achieve their legitimate aims, Teems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349,
370 (1910); Robinson v. California 370 U.S. 660, 677 (1962) (Douglas,
J., concurring).(3) Punishments may be cruel and unusual if greatly disproportionate
to the behavior occasioning punishment. Excessive punishment has
been held unconstitutional many times, See, e.g., Jordan v. Fitzhar-
ris, 257 F. Supp. 674, 679 (N.D. Cal. 1966). For example, a minor rule
infraction alone should not result in highly consequential action
from the affected individual's viewpoint. Of course, serious behav-
ior may lead to minor consequences and the individual will not be
aggrieved.
(4) Punishments may be ruled cruel and unusual based on a compari-
son with prevailing practice, as suggested in Landman v. Royster,
333 F. Supp. 621, 646 (E.D. Va. 1971), citing Rudolph v. Alabama, 375
U.S. 889 (1968) (Goldberg, J., dissenting from denial of cert.).
8. 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
9. Cf. Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483 (1969), as to the watering down of the
"hands off doctrine."
10. 397 U.S. at 262-63.
(1) a timely and effective notice;
(2) an opportunity to be heard;
(3) the right to confront or cross-examine adverse witnesses;
(4) the right to retained counsel;
(5) a statement as to the reasons for the determination made
and the facts relied upon, all of which must have been adduced
at the hearing; and
(6) an impartial decision maker.11
The response by the lower courts to subsequent requests for
due process in prison discipline cases was extremely varied.
12
Support for an expansive reading of Goldberg's due process
implications in the prison discipline setting was provided by two
subsequent Supreme Court cases.
In Morrissey v. Brewer1 3 the due process requirements for
parole revocation were considered. The cases arose as habeas
corpus proceedings involving two parolees who were arrested
as parole violators and confined in a county jail on instructions
from their parole officers. After review of the parole officer's
report of their alleged violations, their parole was revoked by
the state board of parole.1 4 The issue before the Court was
whether the revocations had denied the petitioners due process
since their paroles had been revoked without a hearing. In mak-
ing its determination, the Court began by reviewing the function
of parole in the correctional process. 5 After finding the termi-
nation of parole a "grevious loss" since the liberty enjoyed by
the parolee is similar to the unqualified liberty of the general
population, 6 it determined due process requirements do apply
generally to parole revocation. The Court found the fourteenth
amendment required an informal hearing that would "assure
that the finding of a parole violation will be based on verified
facts" and that the decision-maker would exercise his discretion
based on an "informed but accurate knowledge of the parolee's
behavior.' 7 The requirement was derived from an analysis of
the state's interest. It was found that while the state had a strong
interest in returning the parolee to prison without a new adver-
11. Id. at 268-71.
12. See Harrison, Civil Rights: Procedural Due Process In Prison Discipli-
nary Hearings, 26 OKLA. L. REV. 261 (1973).
13. 408 U.S. 471 (1972).
14. Id. at 472-74.
15. Id. at 477-80.
16. Id. at 481-82.
17. Id. at 484.
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sary proceeding where a violation exists, it had no interest in
summary treatment of the issue.18
Specifically, the Court found two instances where due process
is required in the revocation of parole, the preliminary hearing
and the revocation hearing. At the former, a determination is
required to establish whether there was "probable cause or
reasonable ground to believe that the arrested parolee had
committed acts that would constitute a violation of parole
conditions ., The following requirements were promul-
gated:
(1) Notice that the hearing would take place and that its
purpose would be to determine whether there is probable cause
to believe the parolee committed a violation;
(2) An opportunity to be heard and present evidence;
(3) The right to cross-examine adverse witnesses unless the
hearing officer determines that a risk of harm to the informant
would result from disclosure of his identity;
(4) A hearing officer not directly involved in tha case; and,
(5) A summary by the hearing officer stating the reason for
his decision and the evidence relied upon.
20
At the revocation hearing the minimum requirements of due
process were found to be:
(a) written notice of the claimed violations of parole; (b) disclosure to
the parolee of evidence against him; (c) opportunity to be heard in
person and to present witnesses and documentary evidence; (d) the
right to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses (unless the
hearing officer specifically finds good cause for not allowing confron-
tation); (e) a "neutral and detached" hearing body such as a traditional
parole board, members of which need not be judicial officers or law-
yers; and (f) a written statement by the fact finders as to the evidence
relied on and reason for revoking parole.2 1
The question of the right to a retained or appointed counsel at
the hearings was not reached in Morrissey. In Gagnon v. Scar-
pelli22 the Court reached this issue, as well as the due process
requirements in probation revocation. Gagnon, a felony proba-
18. Id. at 483.
19. Id. at 485.
20. Id. at 485-87.
21. Id. at 489.
22. 411 U.S. 778 (1973).
tioner was apprehended along with a known criminal in the
commission of a burglary. After being advised of his constitu-
tional rights, Gagnon admitted committing the burglary. His
probation was summarily revoked. The case arose as a writ of
habeas corpus application. The petitioner challenged his con-
fession as having been made under duress. 3 The Court held
that due process requirements for parole revocation were
equally applicable to probation revocation in view of the similar
loss of liberty.24 Due process was also held to require represen-
tation by counsel where fundamental fairness indicates that the
effectiveness of the Morrissey rights would be hampered with-
out such assistance. The Court included considerations of the
complexity of presenting pertinent facts and the ability of the
probationer to speak effectively for himself in deciding upon
the need for counsel. A statement of grounds for refusal was
required to be placed in the record.25
With these applications of the broad language of Goldberg in
the corrections field, ample justification was present for the
requirement of considerable safeguards in prision discipline
cases.26 Nonetheless, deference to the exigencies of the correc-
tions environment was found to preclude many of the due proc-
ess requirements of parole and probation revocation hearings
in Wolff v. McDonnell.27 McDonnell, an inmate of a Nebraska
state prison, brought a civil rights action alleging, inter alia that
disciplinary proceedings did not comply with the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. He had been denied
"good time" credit, earned pursuant to a Nebraska statute, 28 in a
disciplinary action authorized "in flagrant or serious cases" of
misconduct. 29 The procedures used in the disciplinary action
involved a conference between the inmate accused, the chief
corrections supervisor and the charging party, to inform the
prisoner of the charge and discuss its merits; and a conduct
report was prepared and a hearing was held before the prison
disciplinary body wherein the inmate was read the report and
given an opportunity to question the charging party.3
Justice White's decision rejected the assertion that the proce-
23. Id. at 779-80.
24. Id. at 782.
25. Id. at 787-91.
26. See, e.g., Clutchette v. Procunier, 328 F. Supp. 767 (N.D. Cal. 1971),
modified, 497 F. 2d 809 (9th Cir. 1974).
27. 418 U.S. 539 (1974).
28. NEB. REV. STAT. § 83-1,107 (1943).
29. NEB. REV. STAT. § 83-185 (1943).
30. 418 U.S. at 542-53.
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dure for disciplining prisoners is "a matter of policy raising no
constitutional issue."'31 The Court reaffirmed its position that all
constitutional rights were not lost at the prison door. Due proc-
ess rights were deemed to be diminished, however, "by the nat-
ure of the regime to which (the inmates) have been lawfully
committed. '32 Justice White also ruled the statutory "good time"
was "liberty" within the protection of the fourteenth amend-
ment.
33
The decision found the loss of "good time" sufficiently grevi-
ous to require protection by due process, but found the interest
to be considerably less than was involved in the parole and
probation revocation cases since the loss was neither as im-
mediate or as certain. It also found the State's interests to be of a
much more compelling nature:
Prison disciplinary proceedings ... take place in a closed, tightly
controlled environment peopled by those who have chosen to violate
the criminal law and who have been lawfully incarcerated for doing
so. Some are first offenders, but many are recidivists who have re-
peatedly employed illegal and often very violent means to attain their
ends. They may have little regard for the safety of others or their
property or for the rules designed to provide an orderly and reason-
ably safe prison life. Although there are very many varieties of pris-
ons with different degrees of security, we must realize that in many of
them the inmates are closely supervised and their activities controlled
around the clock. Guards and inmates co-exist in direct and intimate
contact. Tension between them is unremitting. Frustration, resent-
ment, and despair are commonplace. Relationships among the in-
mates are varied and complex and perhaps subject to the unwritten
code that exhorts inmates not to inform on a fellow prisoner.34
Based on these conflicting needs and reasserting the need for
flexible application of due process, the decision found the Ne-
braska discipline proceeding sorely lacking. Advance written
notice of charges, at least 24 hours prior to appearance before
the disciplinary body, was found necessary to allow the prisoner
an opportunity to obtain facts in his defense and to clarify the
charge against him. The decision also found a need for a written
statement by the fact-finding body setting further evidence and
reasons for the discipline taken. This procedure was necessary
to protect against uninformed collateral action based on the dis-
31. Id. at 555.
32. Id. at 556.
33. Id. at 558.
34. Id. at 561-62.
cipline, such as reclassification and parole consideration. The
provision also was seen as a guard against improper exercise of
discretion. It was recognized that in some instances the evidence
relied upon in the decision may be of such a sensitive nature as
to render improvident its inclusion in the record. In these cases
a statement explaining its omission would suffice. 35
The Court also found a conditional right to present evidence
and call witnesses in defense in those cases which would not
present undue hazards to safety or correctional goals. The
Court went on to rule that while a statement of reason for
refusal to allow witnesses to be called would be helpful, it was
not mandated by the constitution, and prison officials' discre-
tion in this regard should remain as unfettered as possible.36
The right to cross examine and the right to assistance of
counsel were not found to be present because of the inherent
dangers and the non-adversary, rehabilative nature of the ac-
tion. In dicta, Jutice White did indicate that where an inmate is
incapable of the collection and presentation of evidence, he
should be allowed assistance from a member of the staff or
fellow inmate .3 The decision as to due process ended with the
following caveat:
Our conclusion that some, but not all, of the procedures specified in
Morrissey and Scarpelli must accompany the deprivation of good time
by state prison authorities is not graven in stone. As the nature of the
prison disciplinary process changes ... circumstances may then exist
which will require further consideration and reflection of this court.
38
The dissenting opinions of Justice Marshall, joined by Justice
Brennan and Justice Douglas expressed a need for greater pro-
cedural protection to preserve the liberty interest of the in-
mates. Justice Marshall pointed to the diminishing impact de-
nial of "the procedural tools essential to presentation of any
meaningful defense" has on the safeguards which were re-
quired. 39 Justice Douglas contended the potential loss of the
inmate is sufficient to afford him a "full hearing with all due
process safeguards." He analogized the risks to the security and
safety in prisons to the risks entailed in allowing bail before
trial.40
Considering the Court's statement in Wolff, that the require-
35. Id. at 563-65.
36. Id. at 566.
37. Id. at 567-70.
38. Id. at 571-72 (footnote omitted).
39. Id. at 581-82.
40. Id. at 594, 600.
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ments and limitations therein were not "graven in stone," the
Court has nevertheless been niggardly in its allowance of new
due process rights. In Baxter v. Palmigiano41 the Supreme
Court struck down a Ninth Circuit rule requiring prison au-
thorities to justify their denial of cross-examination rights to an
inmate by citing a concern mentioned in Wolff, such as repris-
als, unmanageability, disruption, and safety of prison person-
nel. Failure to so justify a denial had been ruled prima facie
evidence of abuse of discretion.42 The Ninth Circuit had also
held the reasons for discipline must be based on facts revealed
in the hearing. This rule was also struck down.43 The reasons for
rejecting the extensions of the Appeals Court were they were
"either inconsistent with the 'reasonable accommodation'
reached in Wolff, or premature on the bases of the record be-
fore (the Court)." Additionally, the Court held the require-
ments of Miranda v. Arizona45 and Mathis v. United States4 6
need not be met to render pretrial statements admissible in
disciplinary hearings.
47
Due process protections were further undermined in
Meachum v. Fano48 and Montanye v. Haymes,4 9 In Meachum,
the Court held the transfer of a state prisoner to an institution
with less favorable conditions does raise due process implica-
tions "absent a state law or practice conditioning such transfers
on proof of serious misconduct or the occurence of other
events. '50 The Justices agreed interprison transfers did not in-
volve a liberty interest within the meaning of the due process
clause. The nature of the loss, and not its griveousness, was held
to be determinative. Since confinement in any of the states
prisons was within the sentence imposed, no new procedural
rights were forthcoming." Montanye extended this rule to
41. 425 U.S. 308 (1976).
42. Id. at 322.
43. Id. at 323 n.5.
44. Id. at 324.
45. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
46. 391 U.S. 1 (1968).
47. 425 U.S. at 315.
48. 427 U.S. 215 (1976).
49. 427 U.S. 236 (1976).
50. 427 U.S. at 216.
51. Id. at 223-25.
transfer that were classified as punitive. 52 The Court warned
that to protect the "ephemeral and insubstantial" interest of a
prisoner in staying at a particular institution "would place the
due process clause astride the day-to-day functioning of state
prisons and involve the judiciary in issues and discretionary
decisions that are not the business of federal judges. '5 3
The utility of the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment as a protection in prison discipline does not appear
to be too great. To be within the liberty concept, an interest must
be substantial, not removed by conviction, and grounded in the
federal constitution or state law. When applicable, the degree of
due process is determined by the grievousness and nature of the
loss to the individual and the nature of the prison's interest. The
custodial nature of prisons has been held to limit the right to call
witnesses and substantially abrogate the right to confrontation.
Exercise of statutory created discretion by prisons officials is
apparently beyond the reach of due process limitations.
II. PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS IN JUVENILE JUSTICE: THE
SUPREME COURT PERSPECTIVE
The evolution of juvenile justice in the United States has
largely been a process motivated by benevolent intentions, but
has resulted in counterproductive systems and cruel treatment
of juveniles.5 4 Due process has been severely circumscribed by
the parens patriae concept, and has only recently begun to
recover.55 Supreme Court expansion of due process in juvenile
proceedings began with Kent v. United States.5 6 Speaking to
the waiver of jurisdiction by juvenile courts, Justice Fortas'
decision recognized the statutory right to the benefits of
juvenile jurisdiction and the grievious effect of the loss of that
right. Thus it was concluded that the District of Columbia stat-
ute allowing waiver, read in light of the due process clause and
the right to assistance of counsel, required an informal hearing,
assistance of counsel, access to records considered by the court,
and a statement of the reasons for the decision.57
The landmark case of In re Gault58 dealt with the adjudica-
52. 427 U.S. at 242.
53. 427 U.S. at 228-29.
54. See generally Fox, Juvenile Justice Reform: An Historical Perspec-
tive, 22 STAN. L. REv. 1187 (1970).
55. See generally Wong, The Continuing Turbulence Surrounding the
Parens Patriae Concept in American Juvenile Courts, (Pts. 1-2), 18 McGILL L.J.
219, 418 (1972).
56. 383 U.S. 541 (1966).
57. Id. at 557.
58. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
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tion of delinquency. In arriving at the procedures required, the
Court noted that in spite of the fact there is no adjudication of
guilt of a crime, and confinement is rehabilative and non-puni-
tive, adjudication of deliquency can result in prolonged in-
stitutionalization and loss of liberty.5 9 The Court, mandated (1)
notice sufficiently in advance of the proceedings to afford a
reasonable opportunity to prepare, setting forth the alleged mis-
conduct with particularity; (2) right to counsel for the accused
juvenile if delinquency may result in commitment; and,-(3) the
privilege against self-incrimination, the right to confrontation,
and the right to cross-examination."°
In re Winship6 1 also dealt with the adjudicatory stage, requir-
ing the proof beyond a reasonable doubt standard in juvenile
delinquency proceedings. 62 The Court found no sufficient basis
on which to allow a lesser standard in juvenile proceedings, and
rationalized the standard would not adversely affect state
policies precluding criminal conviction and deprivation of civil
rights, or the confidentiality, informality, flexibility and speed
of the hearings.6 3
McKeiver v. Pennsylvania6 4 found no due process require-
ment of a jury trial in delinquency adjudication. The applicable
due process in juvenile proceedings was stated as fundamental
fairness necessary for accurate fact finging.65 The plurality of
four Justices found the impanelling of a jury would not suffi-
ciently aid in fact finding but it would cause the proceedings to
become adversary, protracted, public, and less protective. 66 Nor
could they identify any of the failures of the juvenile justice
system which would be remedied by the presence of a jury.67
Justice Brennan concluded that juries were not required so long
as some other aspect of the adjudication process allows for
protection against oppression by the state or improper dis-
charge of judicial duties. He found these protections in the abili-
59. Id. at 27.
60. Id. at 33-57.
61. 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
62. Id. at 368.
63. Id. at 366-67.
64. 403 U.S. 528 (1971).
65. Id. at 543-51.
66. Id. at 545-51.
67. Id. at 547.
ty of any party so agrieved to "appeal to the community at large
for executive redress through the medium of public indigna-
tion. ' 68 Justice Harlan concurred, based on his belief that nei-
ther the sixth amendment nor the due process clause requires
states to provide criminal jury trials.69
The Court's approach to requests for due process in juvenile
proceedings reveals an attempt to maximize the efficiency of
the fact finding process without upsetting the rehabilitative ide-
als of the juvenile justice system.70 Parens patriae, while not a
byword for arbitrariness, is allowed to limit due process when a
rehabilitative goal will be furthered.
III. PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS IN JUVENILE
CORRECTIONS DISCIPLINE
The lower federal courts have been relatively liberal in grant-
ing injunctions against disciplinary practices in juvenile correc-
tions institutions. The majority of these cases have dealt with
cruel and unusual punishment used as disciplinary measures
and the substantive due process right to treatment abridged by
reformatory conditions.71 In Nelson v. Heyne,72 consideration
was given to the right to treatment as a quid pro quo for soci-
ety's exercise of parens patriae controls." Even though this
reasoning was embraced by the circuit court on appeal, 4 the
quid pro quo rationale was criticized by the Supreme Court in a
case involving involuntary commitment of mental patients as
being incapable of co-existence with the flexible concept of due
process.7 5 The district court in Nelson found due process to be
required when incarcerated juveniles were placed in solitary
confinement, apparently relying largely upon cruel and unusual
punishment implications and the right to treatment. The Court
merely required an informed decision and that the child be
made aware of the reason for the confinement. 76 In Morales v.
Turman,77 it mandated the following procedures after a juvenile
68. Id. at 554-55.
69. Id. at 557.
70. See generally Simpson, Rehabilitation as the Justification of a Sepa-
rate Juvenile Justice System, 64 CAL. L. REV. 984 (1976), questioning the propri-
ety of this approach.
71. See, e.g., Martarella v. Kelly, 349 F. Supp. 575 (S.D.N.Y. 1972), and
Inmates of Boys' Training School v. Affleck, 346 F. Supp. 1354 (D.R.I. 1972).
72. 355 F. Supp. 451 (N.D. Ind. 1972), aff'd, 491 F.2d 352 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 417 U.S. 976 (1974).
73. Id. at 458-61.
74. 491 F.2d at 360.
75. O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 584-89 (1975).
76. 355 F. Supp. at 457.
77. 383 F. Supp. 53 (E.D. Tex. 1974), rev'd on other grounds, 535 F.2d 864
(5th Cir. 1976), rev'd per curiam, 430 U.S. 322 (1977).
652
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had been in solitary confinement for five consecutive days or in
security confinement for ten consecutive days: (1) a hearing
before (2) an impartial tribunal which must (3) file written find-
ings within forty-eight hours with the executive director of the
state youth commission, (4) a right to representation by an advo-
cate of his choice, and (5) a right to cross-examination and
presentation of evidence and witnesses.
78
An interesting contrast and a possible indication of the re-
sponse that can be expected from the Meachum and Montanye
decisions is found in LoUis v. New York State Department of
Social Services.79 In response to a class action suit by juveniles
claiming their treatment in a state training school to be cruel
and unusual, the district court had issued a preliminary injunc-
tion enjoining long periods of isolation except under regulations
to be approved by the court.80 In response to the Second Cir-
cuit's treatment of Sostre v. McGinnis8l the court modified its
earlier decree so as to obviate the need for submission of pro-
posed regulations. The court thereby recognized the concept
later supported by the Supreme Court,82 that regulation of the
administration of state custodial institutions by the federal
courts was to be undertaken only in the most extraordinary
circumstances.
83
In Meachum v. Fano, the Court suggested an alternative to its
many restrictive requirements when it stated; "The individual
States, of course, are free to follow another course, whether by
statute, by rule or regulation, or by interpretation of their own
constitutions. ' '84 The potential of state forums varies greatly.
The Supreme Court of Illinois in In re Washington85 relied on
Meachum in finding no protectable liberty interest in non-
emergency discipline. The court stated,
Given a valid conviction, the criminal defendant has been constitu-
tionally deprived of his liberty to the extent that the State may confine
78. Id. at 84.
79. 328 F. Supp. 1115 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
80. Lollis v. New York Dep't of Social Services, 322 F. Supp. 473 (S.D.N.Y.
1970).
81. 442 F.2d 178 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 978 (1972).
82. 427 U.S. 215, 229 (1976).
83. 328 F. Supp. 1115, 1119 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
84. 427 U.S. 215, 229 (1976).
85. 65 Ill. 2d 391, 359 N.E.2d 133 (1976).
him and subject him to the rules of its prison system so long as the
conditions of confinement do not otherwise violate the Constitution."
In New York however, transfer to maximum security confine-
ment has been held contrary to an adult reformatory sentence,87
and due process has been mandated before one may be trans-
fered from a reformatory, even though the transfer was discre-
tionary and within the sentence imposed.88 In applying its
concepts of fairness and constitutional rights to Wolff, the New
Jersey Supreme Court provides for many due process require-
ments not found by the United States Supreme Court.8 9 These
cases indicate that the state forum can provide a favorable
vehicle for seeking due process where the federal courts may be
less productive. Perhaps the Supreme Court has perceived the
need for extra-constitutional protections, evinced by lower
court cases.9
Protection afforded by the due process clause in juvenile
corrections discipline has been scant. Where found, the analysis
has not been as lucid as that of the Supreme Court in Morris-
sey.91 If a court were to undertake such a thorough analysis of
juvenile corrections, it would find a system whose raison d'etre
is to rehabilitate rather than punish,92 but a system which has
failed to achieve its goal to any appreciable extent.93 Instead, it
has served to illustrate "that unbridled discretion, however be-
nevolently motivated, is frequently a poor substitute for princi-
ple and procedure. ' '94 Juveniles are frequently sentenced to the
care of state authorities for their minorities or until their re-
sponse to treatment is deemed satsifactory 5 Restriction of state
efforts to rehabilitate are discouraged by McKeiver.96 Unfortu-
nately, rehabiliation can be a label of little limitation. In Van v.
Scott,97 an action challenging the constitutionality of the Illinois
Juvenile Court Act as to minors who had violated a lawful court
86. Id., 359 N.E.2d at 137 (footnote omitted).
87. Irving v. Preiser, 358 N.Y.S.2d 805 (1974).
88. Hatzman v. Reid, 364 N.Y.S.2d 396 (1975).
89. Avant v. Clifford, 67 N.J. 496, 341 A.2d 629 (1975).
90. See, e.g., Pena v. New York State Division for Youth, 419 F. Supp. 203,
210 (S.D.N.Y. 1976). The court found it necessary to enjoin violation of existing
state regulations governing room confinement and the use of physical and
medical restraints because of a "doleful record of noncompliance" as to puni-
tive use of isolation, hand and feet restraints and tranquilizing drugs.
91. 408 U.S. 471, 477-90 (1972).
92. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 14-18 (1967).
93. McKeiver v. Penn., 403 U.S. 528, 544 (1971).
94. 387 U.S. at 18.
95. Id. at 8.
96. McKeiver v. Penn., 403 U.S. 528, 547 (1971).
97. 467 F. 2d 1235 (7th Cir. 1972).
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order, the court ruled "neither the label which a State places on
its own conduct, nor even the legitimacy of its motivation, can
avoid the application of the Federal Constitution."9 8 But, the
Supreme Court has stated, "We are reluctant to say that, despite
disappointments of grave dimensions, (the juvenile justice sys-
tem) still does not hold promise, and we are particularly reluc-
tant to say ... that the system cannot accomplish its rehabilita-
tive role."99
The first step in the judicial ascertainment of due process
rights is the finding of a grievous loss to liberty within the
fourteenth amendment's protection.10 0 This liberty must not be
such as was taken away by the adjudication of delinquency. It
must have been granted either by state statute, as in good time
credit, or be constitutionally grounded.1 0 1 If reasonable corporal
punishment is not ruled to constitute cruel and unusual punish-
ment in the juvenile corrections evironment,102 as it has been
ruled in adult institutions,1 03 then it might present a poor case
for grievous loss. By its very reasonableness it would be tempo-
rary in effect and moderate, and therefore similar to the loss of
privileges which the Court has indicated would not be griev-
ous . 1 4 The anti-rehabilitative function corporal punishment can
play 10 5 would militate against this decision, however. Solitary
confinement, on the other hand, presents an excellent constitu-
tionally grounded liberty interest. The district courts in Morales
and Nelson found due process required and the Supreme Court
has indicated a like inclination in Wolff.108
The extent of due process granted is determined by the extent
of the loss to the juvenile and the interest of the state in sum-
mary adjudication. 10 7 Solitary confinement subjects a juvenile
to extensive losses. It is emotionally and psychologically de-
98. Id. at 1240.
99. McKeiver v. Penn., 403 U.S. 528, 547 (1971).
100. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972).
101. Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 223-25 (1976).
102. Cf. Nelson v. Heyne, 491 F.2d 352,354-56 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 417 U.S.
976 (1974).
103. Jackson v. Bishop, 404 F. 2d 571 (8th Cir. 1968).
104. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 571-72 n.19 (1974).
.105. Nelson v. Heyne, 491 F.2d 352,354-56 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 976
(1974).
106. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 571-72 n.19 (1974).
107. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262-63 (1970).
bilitating and serves neither treatment nor punitive goals. 0 8 If it
is continued for more than a short period it can cause" 'sensory
deprivation, withdrawal, or perhaps psychotic or autistic be-
havior.' "109 In the case of juveniles, solitary confinement is even
more of a loss than for adults. As the affidavit of a expert
witness recited in Lollis v. New York State Department of So-
cial Services states:
What is true in this case for adults is of even greater concern with
children and adolescents. Youngsters are in general more vulnerable
to emotional pressures than mature adults; isolation is a condition of
extraordinarily severe pyschic stress; the resultant impact on the
mental health of the individual exposed to such stress will always be
serious, and can occasionally be disastrous.11
On the other hand, the state may have some interest in solitary
confinement for the safety of others or for security, and perhaps
for treatment when used for short duration. The need for ex-
perimentation in rehabilitation by the States is noted in McKeiv-
er."' The need for timely feedback to the juvenile, and the
inappropriateness of federal court supervision of the state pen-
al systems" 2 are also interests of the state. When solitary
confinement continues for extended periods, it would appear to
become ripe for due process protection.
The difference in environments between adult and juvenile
correctional facilities would indicate the need for some pro-
cedural safeguards not granted in Wolff for juvenile discipline.
The inability of juveniles to represent themselves adequately is
much more likely than in the case of an adult. The assistance of
a counsel substitute would seem to be necessary. The Supreme
Court recognized this possibility Wolff.
Where an illiterate inmate is involved, however, or where the complex-
ity of the issue makes it unlikely that the inmate will be able to collect
and present the evidence necessary for an adequate comprehension of
the case, he should be free to seek the aid of a fellow inmate, or if that
is forbidden, to have adequate substitute aid in the form of help from
the staff or from a sufficiently competent inmate designated by the
staff.,13
The likelihood of retribution by juvenile delinquents would not
seem to be as great as in the case of adults. A method whereby
the right to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses
108. Nelson v. Heyne, 355 F. Supp. 451, 456 (N.D. Ind. 1972), aff'd, 491 F.2d
352 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 976 (1974).
109. Inmates of Boy's Training School v. Affleck, 346 F. Supp. 1354, 1366
(D.R.I. 1972).
110. 322 F. Supp. 423, 481 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
111. 403 U.S. 528, 547 (1971).
112. Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 229 (1976).
113. 418 U.S. 539, 570 (1974).
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would be retained unless the disciplinary board determined that
a risk of harm to the informant would result from disclosure of
his identity would seem appropriate.11 4
The unwillingness of the Court to allow impediments on state
experimentation presents a serious problem. The entire juvenile
justice system, with its most heinous abuses, has been justified
by its treatment aspects. It must be argued that just as the
adjudication process is a portion of the treatment for which due
process is required, so is discipline. Like adjudication, disci-
pline must be based on the facts of a course of behavior which
requires negative reinforcement. Without a realistic opportuni-
ty for unimpassioned, rational fact finding, discipline will be
counterproductive.
Fair decision making is both a legal and correctional objec-
tive. The anger and frustration that flow from decisions per-
ceived as unfair are almost impenetrable barriers to construc-
tive correctional effort. Offenders should be active participants
in the process, not powerless bystanders. Mutually agreed upon
goals are far more likely to be reached than those imposed
unilaterally upon another. Research in this area has been lim-
ited, but does ". . . suggest that the appearance as well as the
actuality of fairness, impartiality, and order liness-in short, the
essentials of due process-may be ... impressive and ...
therapeutic."11
5
The cruel and unusual punishment and substantive due proc-
ess approaches of the federal courts in their juvenile discipline
cases appear to overlook the possibly useful tool of procedureal
due process. To avoid imposing due process requirements, a
court may find no liberty interest within the meaning of the
fourteenth amendment, find the method possibly rehabilitative,
and defer to the states' judgment, or simply refuse to supervise
the state correctional institutions. But in so doing, the courts
will be missing an opportunity to provide a positive influence on
the juvenile justice system. As Justice Fortas stated in Gault,
"It is [the] instruments of due process which enhance the possi-
bility that truth will emerge from the confrontation of opposing
114. Cf. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 487 (1972)..
115. 387 U.S. at 26 n.37.
versions and conflicting data. 'Procedure is to law what 'scien-
tific method' is to science.' 116
IV. A DECISION MAKING MODEL FOR ADMINISTRATION OF
DISCIPLINE IN JUVENILE CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTIONS
The restrictive rulings of the Supreme Court in the area of
due process rights of the imprisoned should not be viewed by
juvenile correctional institution administrators as a return to
the peaceful days of the "hands off" doctrine. It is, rather, a
period when a conservative approach to intervention dictates
allowing states to initiate procedures which are constitutionally
satisfactory and supportive of correctional goals. It is certainly
in their own best interest that administrators who are most
knowledgeable about the problems involved, develop policies
and procedures which will accommodate the needs of the sys-
tem as well as the interests of convicted offenders. The more
adequate such internal controls are, the less necessary it will be
for courts to intervene to define requisite procedures to review
the merits of correctional decisions. 117 Also, decision makers
must allocate the precious and limited correctional resources
available. Managers have a major interest in assuring that these
resources are allocated as carefully and objectively as possible.
The goal is to spend no more, or less, than necessary in each
case to accomplish the purposes of institutional placement. Ju-
dicial interest in correctional decision making has proved to be
a powerful stimulant to change, but courts can only react to the
questions raised through litigation, not seek out problems that
need resolution. Necessary changes should not await court ac-
tion when it is known what the law and good correctional prac-
tice require. Certainly, the judiciary prefers this approach. It is
recognized that "[w]hat is needed is to provide offenders under
correctional authority protections against arbitrary action, not
to create for all correctional decision making a mirror image of
trial procedure." 118
While this decision making model is addressed to the adminis-
tration of discipline, it is urged that no distinction between disci-
pline and other means of treatment, such as classification,
necessitates a separate system for their administration. This is
reflected by the make-up of programs directed primarily at
changing behavior, where discipline and classification are
116. Id. at 21.
117. See THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINIS-
TRATION OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: CORRECTIONS (1967).
118. Id. at 84.
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conceived as overlapping. Staffs are organized into teams
which focus on both functions simutaneously. The two are
viewed as indistinguishable and call for a single decision mak-
ing system.
The courts are also tending to view discipline and classifica-
tion as similar. They are looking past the reasons advanced by
correctional administrators for actions that deprive and focus-
ing upon the substantive impact of the deprivation. When re-
strictions are the same, there is no meaningful difference be-
tween punishment and preventive segregation.11 9 The Landman
Court noted: "Deprivations of benefits of various sorts may be
used so long as they are related to some valid penal objective
and substantial deprivations are administered with due process.
'Security' or 'rehabilitation' are not shibboleths to justify any
treatment.
1 120
Any action which has the effect of taking something away
that was possessed or denying something which could reason-
ably be expected by the individual as a part of the regular
program should be carried out within the principles and proce-
dures outlined in this decision-making model. The central issue
is whether a "deprivation" may occur. The reason for involing a
"deprivation" such as discipline, treatment or security status
has no bearing on whether decision-making standards are em-
ployed.
Impetus from the courts obviously is the primary motivating
force toward more precise decision-making standards. The de-
cision-making model, incorporates the requirements emerging
from this trend. It goes further, however, and recognizes what
should be sound correctional practice.
Decision-Making Model
This decision-making model is designed for youthful offend-
ers who are placed indeterminately in correctional institutions
for training and treatment. It assumes that the institution is
organized around treatment teams which are delegated major
decision making responsibility.
119. In re Hutchinson, 23 Cal. App. 3d 337,341, 100 Cal. Rptr. 124, 127 (1972).
120. Landman v. Royster, 333 F. Supp. 621, 645 (E.D. Va. 1971).
Elements of the Model. This model is made-up of three deci-
sion making levels. These are illustrated in Appendix I. At the
highest levels serious behavior may lead to the most consequen-
tial actions. More precise decision-making standards apply. Les-
ser behavior may lead to lower order results, using a lesser
decision-making standard. In other words, as the potential re-
sults rise in magnitude, higher decision-making standards are
applied. This carries out the due process principle that the inter-
ests of the state and individual must be balanced using greater
care as the potential consequence to the individual increase. It
also brings about some correspondence between the magnitude
of behavior and result, meeting one of the principles encom-
passed in the prohibition against cruel and unusual punish-
ment.
Additionally, the model incorporates three processes; namely,
preparation, hearing, and review. These must be followed in
order. A common shortcoming of correctional decisions is that
one or more of these processes are omitted, or they are not
followed in sequence. For example, a decision to impose a seri-
ous sanction may be hastily reached before the facts are collect-
ed and exposed to an impartial fact finding process. Apart from
potential unfairness, confusion often results and a great deal
more time may be taken than actually required.
1. Circumstances justifying action.
One of the serious shortcomings of correctional systems is
program objectives are not specified with precision in individu-
al cases, and institution rules are often vague. Fair decisions are
rooted in clearly stated expectations. Given this, failure to meet
expectations may result in action intended to correct behav-
ior.121 Behavior that may result in action is of two kinds, namely,
rule or law violations or failure to meet program objectives.
Rules and law violations are acts or occurrences that stand
alone. They are something which an individual does; the indi-
vidual is the actor. The decision-making levels at which specific
rules or law violations are placed, in order of seriousness, is
largely a matter of policy or judgment, taking into consideration
the context in which the program operates.
121. Landman weighed the justification for vagueness in institution rules
and concluded ". . . that the existence of some reasonably definite rule is a
prerequisite to prison discipline of any substantial sort." Moreover, regulations
must be ".. . distributed, posted, or otherwise made available in writing..
333 F. Supp. 621 at 656.
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One of the major weaknesses of the correctional system is
that treatment is not individualized with enough specificity so
that separate, concrete plans are made and carried out for each
person. All actions should be directed toward the accomplish-
ment of pre-established correctional goals. An advantage of this
decision-making model is it helps force the development of spe-
cific program plans. If plans are not clear and understood in
advance, they will not suffice as a basis for corrective action.
2. Preparation Process
The first step is a "preparation stage." It is very simple for
lower level decisions, to become more precise standards for
more serious actions.
(a) Temporary Restriction
(1) Lock-Up
Sometimes it is necessary to place a person in temporary lock-
up pending action. This practice has a parallel in juvenile and
criminal court where statutes allow a short period of prelimi-
nary confinement before formal action is undertaken. Confine-
ment at this point is not used for therapeutic purposes. A person
should not be locked up unless he is a danger to himself or
others, or is an escape risk. Lock up, at this stage, must be as
short as possible and only when this criterion applies. At the
same time, enough latitude must exist to take care of emergen-
cies.122 With each increase in length of lock-up, higher adminis-
trative levels of approval are required. Long periods of lock-up
should be exceptional and would probably occur only when
there is a major institutional disturbance and the time required
by the emergency does not allow rapid follow through with the
system as a whole. In no case should lock up be used in lieu of
carrying out the policies and procedures required by this model.
It may be necessary to lock-up for longer periods when the
matter is referred to the district attorney for prosecution. Here
the time interval is almost totally dependent upon local au-
thorities. However, persons should not be locked up simply be-
cause court action is pending. The criterion for lock-up is the
122. Urbano v. McCorkle, 334 F. Supp. 161, 168 (D.N.J. 1971).
same, regardless of whether the decision will be made internal-
ly, or by the court.
(2) Day Passes or Furloughs
As a temporary measure, it may be necessary to withhold a
scheduled day pass, or other off-grounds activity, pending ac-
tion. From the affected individual's point of view, this is usually
considered a more consequential deprivation than temporary
lock-up. Accordingly, the decision to "withhold" should be re-
served for middle managers, the superintendent, or superin-
tendent designate.
(b) Investigation
It is necessary, of course, to investigate alleged occurrences
that' may serve as a basis for some action. Investigations of this
kind include the collection of facts as to when, where, and how
the incident occurred and what it was all about. Investigation, in
the formal sense, is not required when failure to accomplish
program objectives is the basis for action, provided that these
failures can be described with precision.
Quite often, the behavior which occasions action by correc-
tional staff is also a crime. A decision must be made about
referring the matter to the district attorney for prosecution:
This presents a problem since custodial interrogation may
jeopardize the privilege against self-incrimination. 123 There are
several alternative ways of meeting this problem, 124 but the pre-
ferable one is to withhold institutional action and refer the ac-
tion for prosecution as soon as possible. 125 Care must be taken to
assure the Miranda warnings are given as soon as the investiga-
tion focuses on likely suspects. 126
123. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 478 (1966).
124. See Turner and Daniel, Miranda in Prison: The Dilemma of Prison
Discipline and Intramural Crime, 21 BUFFALO L. REV. 759 (1972).
125. Turner and Daniel, Id., argue the solution reached in Clutchette v.
Procunier, 328 F. Supp. 767, 777 (N.D. Cal. 1971), modified, 497 F. 2d 809 (9th Cir.
1974), is preferable where counsel is required for the inmate. They discount
postponing institutional action, arguing that prison administrators routinely
segregate the accused and subject them to the same deprivations as if convicted
of the criminal misconduct. This is a spurious argument, however. Citizens in
the community at large may be restrained pending trial under some circum-
stances. Those already in institutions need not, and should not, be restrained
further unless they pose a serious escape risk, or are dangerous to others, or
themselves. See also, Baxter v. Palimigiano, 425 U.S. 308 (1976), wherein the
Court ruled an inmates failure to respond to questions at a disciplinary hearing
could be used against him.
126. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 437 (1966) (syllabus) requires the fol-
lowing: "The person in custody must, prior to interrogation, be clearly informed
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(c) Notice
Notice means "information" given to a person telling him
enough about the issue that will be decided in the course of the
action so he can prepare and present information on his own
behalf.127 It may be given orally at the lower decision-making
levels but for more consequential decisions, it must be in writ-
ing. In all instances notice must be given at least twenty-four
hours prior to any disciplinary hearing.128
3. Hearing Process
When the preparation stage is completed, the hearing process
may be started. It has two distinct and separate phases. The first
is directed at whether behavior did, in fact, occur which justifies
some action. Assuming the answer is yes, the second phase
focuses on what to do about it. This process is not intended as an
adversary procedure similar to criminal courts. Rather, it is an
informal adminstrative proceeding that can be likened to a
"forum" where relevant information is brought, discussed, and
a conclusion reached. At the same time, however, certain proce-
dures must be applied so that the essential ingredients of due
process are included.
The hearing process should not start until the individual has
had a reasonable opportunity to prepare. This is especially true
at the higher decision-making levels where written notice is
given, and the person may ask for the assistance of a staff
member. At least forty-eight hours between giving notice and
hearing should be allowed at the highest level, longer upon
request. The time interval may be waived by the individual
involved.
that he has the right to remain silent, and that anything he says will be used
against him in court; he must be clearly informed that he has the right to consult
with a lawyer and to have the lawyer with him during interrogation, and that, if
he is indigent, a lawyer will be appointed to represent him. If the individual
indicates, prior to or during, questioning must cease until an attorney is pre-
sent."
127 "To constitute meaningful notice, at least a brief statement of the facts
upon which the charge is based, as well as the name and number of the rule
allegedly broken must be included." Clutchette v. Procunier, 328 F. Supp. 767,
782 (N.D. Cal. 1971).
128. See note 35, supra, and accompanying text.
(a) Fact Finder-Disposition Maker
The least consequential actions may be taken rapidly, if nec-
essary, by the staff member who observed the behavior. Higher
level decisions should be made by the treatment team.
The fact finder-disposition maker must be "disinterested" or
have no prior involvement in the circumstances, to allow for as
much objectivity as possible. For this reason, the person who
"writes up" the circumstances and those who may be the vic-
tims of incidents must not assume a fact finder role.129 This is
not to say that such persons are excluded from supplying perti-
nent information to the hearing process. 130
(b) Appearance at hearing.
An opportunity must be given the youth to be present at the
hearing so he may hear information presented by others, and
present information having a bearing on the issues.
(c) Representation
Some institutionalized persons simply do not have the skills or
maturity required to speak lucidly for themselves. Their verbal
skills may be limited by education, experience, and in some
cases, intelligence. At the highest decision-making level, the
youth should be given an opportunity to select a staff member
from the team or a panel selected by the superintendent for this
purpose. Two alternatives are provided here since team mem-
bers are often on shift assignment and may not be available at
the time when a decision must be made. In addition, youthful
offenders should have an opportunity to choose a person in
129. Landman required that "... the decision to punish must be made by an
impartial tribunal. This bars any official who reported a violation from ruling
. . .A substantial question arises whether filed unit officials can ever so divorce
themselves from events in their small units sufficiently to sit impartially. The
Court has not been shown that this is impossible, but in any individual case
participation in occurrences giving rise to a charge shall bar any man from
sitting in judgment." 333 F. Supp. 621, 653 (E.D. Va. 1971).
130. Some argue institution personnel cannot be expected to act indepen-
dently if they work in fairly close proximity to the residents. This would be true
of treatment team members, especially since they work daily with those under
their supervision. Morrissey concludes preliminary revocation hearings need
not be conducted by a judicial officer. 408 U.S. 471, 486 (1972). They may be held
by an uninvolved person. It is logical to extend this concept to institution actions
which have the effect of a deprivation. Institution staff are charged with respon-
sibility for carrying out a rehabilitation program. The treatment team concept is
built on the recognition that those who work most closely with institution resi-
dents have the greatest possibility of impact. If decision-making is removed
from their control, it would greatly diminish program effectiveness.
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whom they have some confidence. Representation is not re-
quired at the lower decision-making levels. 131
(d) Witnesses
Confrontation and cross examination of witnesses are highly
prized rights in most fact finding forums. However they are
particularly troublesome since the close proximity of those liv-
ing together in correctional institutions makes it highly vulner-
able to acts of reprisal or pressuring by the stronger residents.
Nonetheless, confrontation and cross examination should be
allowed unless the fact finder determines that witnesses may be
subjected to risk of harm.13 2
(e) Standards of certainty (evidence).
In the absence of some standard of evidence, decisions may
become simply a matter of whim.133 "Preponderance" as a stan-
dard, is less demanding than "beyond a reasonable doubt," the
evidence standard applied by the criminal courts. Stated sim-
ply, preponderance means that a finding must be based on
information showing that it is "more likely than not" that the
circumstances alleged did, in fact, occur.
(f) Written Record
A written record should be made for consequential actions
showing the alleged behavior, information relied upon for the
finding, and reasons for the action taken. Justifiable criticism
has been directed at covert decisions where those involved were
denied clear and concise information.
Records are important since they make it possible to retrace
the steps taken, showing all necessary requirements were met
and what the disposition was intended to accomplish. A ques-
131. See note 113, supra, and accompanying text.
132. See note 114, supra, and accompanying text.
133. "Rules of evidence, as a general proposition, do not rise to constitutional
levels. Thus, it would be inappropriate for... (a federal) court to establish a
'weight of evidence' rule more stringent than the due process clause requires.
When reviewing a disciplinary committee decision... district courts have tradi-
tional standards to review decisions for arbitrariness. It is hoped, although not
constitutionally compelled, that disciplinary committees will apply a 'weight of
the evidence' rule somewhat more exacting." Clutchette v. Procunier, 328 F.
Supp. 767, 784 (N.D. Cal. 1971).
tion arises about retaining records when the fact finding proc-
ess establishes that alleged behavior did not occur. An argu-
ment can be made for retaining these records so it can be shown
that the matter was cleared. It is also suggested that records are
needed for casework purposes. On the other hand, records of
unsubstaintiated behavior may prove detrimental, since users
of the record may simply ignore findings and later treat the
matter as if it did occur. An answer to this question depends on
some extent on who has access to records. On balance, it is
preferable to destroy all records of alleged behavior that is not
substantiated by the decision-making system.
4. Review Process.
A review procedure has the advantages of assuring each case
is audited at the next higher level to assure that the decision-
making model was followed and the disposition was appropri-
ate. A disadvantage is that it does not allow the individual to
appeal what he considers to be errors.134 However, review is
preferable because it is more comprehensive, and it also serves
administrative purposes.
Errors in the hearing process which may be revealed through
review should be sent back to the decision-maker for correction.
The reviewing officer may not go outside the record and
countermand a finding.135 However, provided an affirmative
finding is made, a reviewing officer may change the disposition
as long as the new disposition is permitted at that or a lower
decision-making level.
Staff Roles. Members of the staff are required to assume sev-
eral different roles. They may not be played by the same per-
son.13 6 All staff have a responsibility to report behavior that
may require some action. Beyond this, however, one principle of
134. It is outside the scope of this paper to discuss grievances in their broad-
er context. Suffice it to say, the individual should have access to a grievance
mechanism which can be used in lieu of appeal.
135. "If higher authorities than the disciplinary committee feel duty bound
to re-examine decisions, their review must be restricted to the charge made and
the evidence presented. The practice of going outside the record in search of
basis for punishment must cease. 'It is as much a violation of due process to send
an accused to prison following conviction of a charge on which he was never
tried as it would be convict him upon a charge that was never made.' (Cole v.
Arkansas, 333 U.S. 196)." Landman v. Royster, 333 F. Supp. 621, 653 (E.D. Va.
1971).
136. "Another basic component of fundamental procedural fairness is a
hearing before a relatively objective and impartial tribunal. This principle is
violated when the same.. official assumesthe dual responsibility of (1) initiat-
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fair play is that staff who have some actual or potential personal
involvement, suc as being the victim of an incident should not
carry out certain roles or responsibilities. When this occurs,
professional ethics demand the staff member should withdraw
and not become involved in the decision-making process. Other-
wise, bias or the appearance of bias, may occur.
1. Investigator Role
After behavior is reported which may require action, relevant
facts must be collected. This is not intended to be a highly
technical task requiring the skills associated with law enforce-
ment, except in very difficult cases. It is simply a matter of
objectively collecting information which may be useful in decid-
ing what actually occurred. Collecting facts as an investigator
must not be confused with the fact finder role. The inves-
tigator's task is not to decide whether certain behavior oc-
curred, but rather to collect facts which will assist the fact
finder in determining what occurred.
2. Representative Role
The representative role is to help the young persons get his
point across. It is not intended as an "advocate" or "lawyer."
The fact finding process is not an adversary proceeding but a
forum where all revelant information is brought for screening,
discussion, and decision. The representative must be a staff
person who is available, and should be someone in whom the
youth has some confidence. The staff member fulfilling this role
should assist in helping the young person understand the proc-
ess and have some confidence in its general fairness.
3. Fact Finder-Disposition Maker Role
The fact finding and disposition making role is carried out by
the same staff member or team. However, these are separate
and distinguishable tasks which are carried out in sequence. As
fact finder, the job is to weigh and evaluate information, sorting
ing and pressing charges of misconduct, and (2) subsequently determining as a
member of an administrative body, whether misconduct has occurred and as-
sessing appropriate punishment." Bundy v. Cannon, 328 F. Supp. 165, 172 (D.
Md. 1971).
fact from opinion, and making a finding on the basis of facts.
Following fact finding, the same staff member or team proceed
to the disposition making task. They evaluate behavior in rela-
tion on program goals (casework reasons) and decide on an
appropriate disposition.
4. Reviewer Role
Someone at a higher level than the fact finder-disposition
maker must fulfill a reviewer role. This task is to assure that all
necessary procedures have been followed and that the disposi-
tion is appropriate. The reviewer may modify the disposition in
one direction only; that is, to a similar or lesser deprivation.
Evaluation And Summation
This"decision making model is designed for youthful offend-
ers in correctional institutions where teams have been delegated
primary responsibility for treatment. It assumes the decision to
confine or release is made by another body.
Some argue efficiency may be imperiled and costs will be
excessive if a formalized decision-making system is employed.
Workload is a function of the residents and institution climate
generally. It also depends to some extent on the amount of time
previously given these matters. It is true that some additional
staff time is required at the outset. The system is more complex
than most existing practices. Also, staff quality is directly re-
lated to whether it will operate smoothly and accomplish its
purpose. Those' with experience and some training in legal
concepts find it easier. Workload also depends on the number of
occurrences requiring highly consequential action since they do
require considerable time. Lower order decisions can be made
rather rapidly. Experience suggests that about ten per cent of
actions taken are at the highest decision-making level, fifteen
per cent at the intermediate level, and the remaining seventy-
five per cent at the least consequential level. On the whole,
workload is not increased significantly, though this depends
upon all of these factors.
Staff and youthful offenders alike must be trained thoroughly
so that the principles embodied in the model are understood.
There is a tendency for staff to become immobilized at the
beginning because the concepts may be unfamiliar or seem
alien to correctional practice. This is particularly true with the
information collecting and investigating function. There is a
tendency for staff to be overcautious. It is difficult for some
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case-workers to separate facts from opinions and conclusions.
The need to play several separate and distinct roles is some-
times confusing. This is particularly true of the investigator and
fact finder roles which must be clearly distinguished.
Affording more precisely defined, and perhaps extended,
rights to the offender does mean the existing prerogatives of
staff may be limited. This may be threatening to some staff and
managers. The system focuses on establishing whether certain
behavior occurred and channels the disposition into permiss-
able limits.
There are several persuasive reasons for adopting this model
notwithstanding difficulty in adjusting to it. Clearly defined
procedures facilitate day-to-day institutional operation. When
staff members understand their roles, confusion is reduced, and
responsibility for decision-making is clearly shared. The model
provides a vehicle for communication and. resolution of
conflicts. It also causes staff to act more slowly and deliberately,
especially in serious matters. Experience has shown fewer mat-
ters are referred to higher administrative levels for action. They
are resolved satisfactorily between the resident and staff mem-
ber closest to the situation. Experience has also shown that
decisions are more consistent, qualitatively better, and above
all, more fair.
This model is to be viewed as a positive decision-making
mechanism. There may be a tendency to use this rather complex
decision-making apparatus in an entirely negative way. It is not
intended as a means for dispensing penalities, and should not be
implemented from that perspective. It is an orderly means for
making all major decisions affecting the rehabilitation of youth-
ful offenders in correctional institutions.
V. CONCLUSION
Recent Supreme Court decisions evince a conservative ap-
proach to the requirement of due process safeguards in the
imposition of prison discipline. This trend in no way reflects
the Court's unwillingness to assure that correctional systems
are operated in a constitutional manner. It is instead an effort to
restrain judicial law-making until correctional leadership has
an opportunity to provide the necessary protection of inmates'
constitutional rights through administrative procedure. If the
leadership is not forthcoming, another round of intervention by
the courts can be expected.
Juvenile correctional administrators hopefully will institute
rules and regulations which will guarantee due process protec-
tions for youth in correctional settings at least equal to that
provided adults similarly situated. Analysis indicates this pro-
tection should be greater because most youth are too immature
and are unable to adequately articulate a satisfactory defense.
The position that due process protections are not necessary in a
rehabilitative program, as every action is taken in "the best
interest of the child," is indefensible. The very foundation of
any treatment approach is that it must occur in an environment
in which the juvenile feels he is being handled in a fair and just
manner. Consequently, a treatment setting must necessarily
provide a climate of trust, respect, honesty, and above all, fair-
ness. Hopefully, the protections necessary to provide such an
environment can be developed administratively rather than
superimposed by the courts because of administrative omission.
One means for accomplishing much of this task is provided by
the decision making model herein. Such vehicles should be de-
veloped in response to the benefits of the administrative proc-
ess, not court mandates. In providing a system which goes be-
yond what is required by the courts' interpretations of the
Constitution, correctional administrators can not only remove
themselves from the pale of judicial intervention, but also effect
furtherance of institutional goals.
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APPENDIX I
SUMMARY OF DECISION MAKING MODEL
I
BEHAVIOR REQUIRING ACTION
Failure to meet
pre-established
individual pro-
gram goals.
Minor rule
infraction.
DECISION MAKING STANDARDS
Preparation Process
Temporary
restriction No
Investigation Yes
Notice Oral
Hearing Process
Fact finder-
disposition
maker Staff member
Appearance Yes
Representa-
tion (staff) No
Witnesses
(when disclo-
sure of identi-
ty will not
endanger) Upon request
Standard of
certainty (evi-
dence) Preponderance
Written
record Optional
Review Process
Higher level
review Supervisor
ALTERNATIVE DISPOSITIONS
No action
Extra duty
(Examples) Restrict
privileges
Lock up 24 hours
or less
Decision Making
Levels
II
Failure to meet pi
established individu
program goals.
Major rule infractic
Lesser law violatior
Apply criterion
Yes
Oral
Treatment team
Yes
No
Upon request
Preponderance
Yes
Team leader
(All Level I)
Lock up 24 hours
less
Restrict off groundE
privileges
III
re- Failure to meet
Lal pre-established
individual pro-
.n. gram goals.
k. Major law
violations.
Apply criterion
Yes
Written
Treatment team
Yes
Upon request
Upon request
Preponderance
Yes
Superintendent
(All levels I and
II)
or Change to more
restricted
program
Transfer
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